Next: Policy Language
Up: Representation and Evaluation of
Previous: Related Work
Our framework is applied to distributed systems that span multiple
autonomous administrative domains without a central management
authority. Applications may impose their own security policies
and use different authentication services, e.g. Kerberos, DCE or X.509 certificates.
We assume that within a distributed system, multiple independent
applications coexist. The individual security requirements of each
application are reflected in application-specific security policies.
There might exist common ACLs that apply to sets of applications.
Therefore, we wanted to design a flexible and expressive mechanism for
representing and evaluating authorization policies. It had to be
general enough to support a variety of security mechanisms based
on public or secret key cryptosystems, and it had to be usable by
multiple applications supporting different operations and even different
kinds of protected objects.
The major components of the architecture are:
- Authentication mechanisms perform authentication of users and supply them with initial credentials.
- A group server that maintains group membership information.
- GAA API. Applications call GAA API routines to check
authorization against its authorization model.
The API routines obtain policies from local files, distributed authorization servers, and from credentials provided by the user. They combinine local and distributed authorizations under a single API according to the requirements
of the application.
- Delegation is supported through inclusion of delegation
credentials, such as those supported by restricted proxies [1].
Subsections
Next: Policy Language
Up: Representation and Evaluation of
Previous: Related Work
Tatyana Ryutov
2002-06-25